The Kurds

     Same story, different place.  The Kurds, a minority group that is concentrated in the northern part of Iraq, also Turkey, Syria, Iran, and sprinkled throughout most of the region, suffer almost the same fate as the montagnards of Southeast Asia.  Unlike the montagnards, they do not live off the land and are not "rural," compared to the rest of the society in which they live.  However, they have been historically discriminated against in each country where they reside, have been promised autonomy by various "big" powers, but never realized that goal.  They live in a region that is called Kurdistan and are said to be about 40 million in total.  They are not Arabs, but rather they are of Persian origin and speak a language that is basically Persian.  In Iraq, they make up about 17% of the total Iraqi  population and are predominantly Sunni Muslim in faith.  However, there are Kurds of different religion including Shia Muslim and Christian!  The Kurds themselves are very open to other religions and although they are predominantly Muslim, they appear to be much more liberal in their attitude and women have more freedom than practically in any other Muslim society.  In Iraq, where the dominant faith is Shia, the Kurds had been persecuted not only because of their Sunni faith, but because of their ethnicity as well!
     The Kurds' struggle to gain autonomy, or "independence," has been going on since about the 7th Century AD.  Periodically they did manage to gain autonomy and be independent, but it always seem to end badly.  In short, throughout history they have been trying to get recognition as a separate entity, a separate country made up of distinct people.  In the modern era, there were uprisings against the British in Iraq in 1919 and again in 1930.  In 1960-61 there was another attempt and again in 1970-71, all in Iraq.  From 1980 to 1988 it was perhaps the worst time for the Kurds in Iraq.  Saddam Hussein who was engaged in a war with Iran began a systematic genocide program against the Kurds and killed unaccounted number of people.  During that period he used chemical weapons and killed 50,000 or more Kurds with chemical weapons in one town alone!  The Kurds' last uprising took place in 1991 and almost ended in complete disaster, thanks to our inaction!
     In 1991, at our urging, the Kurds rose up against Saddam Hussein and his regime.  The idea was of course that we would help by bombing and perhaps sending in ground troops to defeat Saddam.  The first Gulf War was launched from the south, from Kuwait, and essentially, the Kurds' involvement would provide a classic pincer movement to defeat Saddam's forces.  Although we moved in from the south, bombarded Iraq with the so-called "shock and awe" tactic (actually that name was coined in the second Gulf War), we did not help  the Kurds when we stopped short of Baghdad!  We stopped our so-called "Gulf War" and held a victory parade in New York, but the Kurds were stuck fighting a superior force of Saddam's Army once our air support stopped.  The problem was that the war ended unexpectedly soon for us in the south!  Saddam's army did not provide the resistance that we thought we would face.  They were like the proverbial "paper tiger" and folded at first sign, surrendering in the thousands!  Our biggest problem was handling the POWs! However in the north, Saddam's forces were still fighting the Kurds, and when we stopped the air support, they doubled their effort!
     Up north, the Army Special Forces teams had been on the ground with the Kurds since before the invasion of Iraq and they had trained the Kurds in small unit tactics and developed forces similar to what we had in Vietnam in the form of montagnard and Nung Mike Forces and Mobile Guerrillas.  These Kurd units, like their predecessors in Vietnam, proved to be superb fighters and were called Peshmerga ("those who face death!").  However, the Kurds had no air force or heavy artillery, basically, they were just light infantry! We managed to establish a "no fly" zone in Kurdistan and thereby saved the Kurds from total annihilation by Saddam's forces.  The Peshmerga also had much to do with discouraging Saddam from pressing on with his campaign. In pitch battles, the Kurds essentially beat the hell out of Saddam's army, despite lack of heavy artillery or air support.
     We all know of the tragedy of Kurds during that period.  Who can forget that famous National Geographic cover photo of a green-eyed Kurdish girl with that haunting look!  All the accusations and chest beating did nothing to help the Kurds.  What did help them was actual shipment of foods and medicines, and the presence of the U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers, who stayed with the Kurds in those miserable refugee camps throughout and helped out as best as they could.  This was a repetition of what happened in Vietnam, what took place because of our inaction and decision to pull out!  In 1991, there were still some older senior NCOs and officers in the Special Forces in their final years before retirement, who remembered bitterly what happened in Vietnam and were determined to do all they could to help the Kurds.  The Kurds survived that period.
     In 2003 we launched the second Gulf War, the so-called "Operation Iraqi Freedom."  Before we committed our ground troops, it was crucial that we got the Kurds to push from the north.  Once again, with US Army Special Forces teams leading the way, the Kurds, Peshmerga forces, launched an attack on Saddam's army in the north.  It was very similar to what we did in Afghanistan a year earlier when Army Special Forces teams went into that country and with Northern Alliance groups, essentially defeated the Taliban without committing any U.S. ground troops (other than several dozen 12 man Army Special Forces teams!).  However, we let things get out of hand, instead of finishing off the Taliban, we became involved in "nation building" and ended up having to bring in U.S. ground troops to stave off the Taliban.  It only worked while we were there in force, witness what is happening now that we have essentially pulled out!
     In 2003, the push by the Kurds from the north was wildly successful.  Despite what happened to them in 1991, they were willing to go to war with US Army Special Forces in their midst.  They have a lot of trust in our Special Forces. Those who followed the news may recall reports of how the Kurds had pushed south and essentially eliminated any of Saddam's forces in the area.  What most Americans don't realize is that we continued to use the Kurds, the Peshmerga, to seek out Saddam's forces.  After all, in those early years, all Iraqi military were Saddam's, we had not yet trained any so called Iraqi Security Forces, the ISFs!  The Peshmerga were crucial in rooting out Saddam's people, including the capture of Saddam himself!  Most Americans watching the evening news or reading the newspapers didn't realize that the so-called Iraqi Commandos that were doing the fighting were actually Peshmerga, Kurds!
     By the time we decided that Saddam's army was no more and Baghdad was secure (sort of, we had the "green zone" that was secure), we started to build the ISF.  The new Iraqi government did not want to have the Peshmerga as a separate force (shades of Vietnam), instead they wanted the Kurd forces incorporated, absorbed by the ISF.  At first the Kurds didn't mind, they thought that this was a step for Kurds to be assimilated into the "new" Iraq, that they would all be one big happy family.  It didn't take long for them to realize that it was not the generosity of the new Iraqi government as much their desire to keep the Kurds from becoming autonomous with a strong military.  The Peshmerga pulled out. 
     The ISF was built up, and so far we poured in 25 Billion Dollars to build the new Iraqi army, the ISF.  The war in Iraq so far (2003-2013) cost us about 3 Trillion Dollars.  I guess it is the inflation that took a big bite.  In comparison, the war in Vietnam for the same period (1965-75) cost us 140 Billion Dollars and to build up the Republic of Vietnam Army, it cost 10 Billion Dollars.  The biggest cost no doubt is all of the new high tech weaponry and equipment, all of those smart bombs and cruise missiles that we fired.  Each time one missile or a bomb went off, you could kiss off couple of million bucks!  With all the money spent and lives lost (at least not as many American lives as in Vietnam), the situation in Iraq is no better than it was 10 years ago!  The only stability that there is in Iraq is in the northern part, in Kurdistan, where the Kurds are in charge!
    

The Aftemath

     Since the end of the Vietnam War, montagnards have been coming to America by way of Refugee Camps in Thailand and now Cambodia.  In 1979, the U.S. government established what was called an "Orderly Departure" program set up to bring refugees from Southeast Asia that qualified for U.S. resettlement under certain criteria, namely connection to the U.S., be it through former employment or other means.  This was mainly done to stem the tide of the Vietnamese "Boat People," refugees that escaped Vietnam and made perilous ocean voyages trying to reach safe havens.
     The Orderly Departure program allowed the entry of many montagnards that had escaped Vietnam and Laos and were in Thailand.  After screening them, if they were found to have some connection to U.S., they were allowed to come as refugees.  Various church groups and other NGOs helped tremendously in this regard in resettling the montagnards.  The Special Forces Association, an association for former and current Special Forces soldiers continuous to play an important role in trying to help the montagnards.
     In America, there are two well known organizations that specialize in helping the montagnards.  One organization, founded in 1986, is called Save the Montagnard People, located in North Carolina.  Former Special Forces soldiers raised money to purchase about 100 acres of land in the hills of North Carolina, very similar to the area from which these montagnards came.  The reason for this set up was to try and help the montagnards retain their culture, their way of life as much as possible.  The organization is constantly trying to raise money to buy more land to add to the existing parcel.  The goal is to ultimately have a large area, a reserve, that is exclusively for the montagnard use.  The other organization is called the Montagnard Foundation Inc., founded in 1990 and located in South Carolina.  This organization is mainly trying to find jobs and homes for montagnards who are resettled in America. There are many other church groups that are involved in trying to help the montagnards.
     One of the problems of resettlement of montagnards is that many were simply brought to America and dumped in inner city ghettos, like East Oakland in California!  There were many problems associated with these types of careless and thoughtless resettlements.  The montagnards are rural people, majority have lived for centuries as farmers and hunter/gatherers.  Most of them lived all of their lives in the hills, without electricity or plumbing.  When you take people like that and dump them in our inner cities, you are going to have some problems!  Some of the newly arrived montagnards after spending some time in the cities, chose to move out to rural areas.  Some, upon hearing that Alaska had vast open lands and plenty of game chose to move to Alaska despite the cold climate.  By all accounts, the montagnards that moved to Alaska are happy in their new surroundings, have adjusted to the cold climate, and live off the land as they did back home!  Others, especially the younger generation, have managed to adapt to the way of life in America.  Sadly, many, because they are in inner cities, turn to gangs and other gang related activities.
     In 2008, Clint Eastwood made a movie called The Gran Torino.  It was basically about a relationship that developed between an aging/dying, somewhat racist, former auto worker and a young H'mong teenager.  Eastwood portrayed the plight of the H'mong people who were resettled in America, in urban area, where many of their young turned to gang activities.  It was well done, but in reality, it was mild compared to what really went on and is still going on with the montagnards.
     It is a problem.  The organizations such as Save the Montagnard People are trying to preserve the montagnard culture.  On their reserve in North Carolina, they built a large Rhade tribe style "long house" in which several families are living just as they did in the Vietnamese Highlands.  They make traditional artifacts, textiles, etc., and sell them to generate income.  Everyone involved realizes that the montagnards cannot live exactly as they did in their homes in the highlands of Vietnam, they have to adjust to living in the more modern environment.  Yet, they must try to preserve their culture and not lose it completely as some of them appear to be doing in more urban areas.
     One thing that I did not mention in my earlier blogs about montagnards is that a very high percentage of these hill people are Christian!  The montagnards basically practice animism, and those who have converted to Christianity appear to easily combine the two!   For example, when holding the "blood brother" ceremony, a medicine man/shaman is called to do the ceremony. Yet, the people involved may very well be all Christian!  They have a very relaxed attitude about these things and don't mind mixing native animism with Christianity.  It is like what Mexican Indians did with Catholicism when they combined it with their native beliefs and came up with celebrations like the "Day of the Dead" El Dia del Muerte, etc.
     Majority of Vietnamese population that is Christian is Catholic.  Before communist take over, they say that about 15% of the population was Catholic.  Today that number has been reduced to about 7%, or so say the communists.  The Catholics in Vietnam were generally those of the upper crust, not always, of course, but generally speaking.  The Protestants, which made up about 1% of the population were always in the minority.  However, among montagnards, Protestants were the majority!  It seems that the montagnards did not take to Catholicism as they did to the Protestant faith which arrived in the highlands in the 1930s by way of American Missionaries.  So, Americans and America, it seems, had the greatest impact on the montagnards.  That is one reason why various Protestant church groups got involved in resettling and helping the montagnards.  Although not all of the montagnards that came to America are Christian, nevertheless, the majority appear to be Protestants!
     No doubt in time the montagnards in America will assimilate completely and, sadly, disappear as a distinct, montagnard group.  There is no way of getting around it.  They cannot possibly survive in our society continuing to live as they did in the Vietnamese Highlands.  The Save the Montagnard People's effort to preserve the culture is admirable, but unfortunately, they are fighting an uphill battle.  Even those montagnards that resettled in Alaska are no longer living exactly as they did in their homeland.  They may very well live off the land like other Alaskan natives, but instead of crossbows and spears, they use modern rifles.  Instead of wearing loincloths, they wear heavy clothing and use snowmobiles!  Everything changes, and in time, the montagnards in America will be montagnards in name only.  They will be like any other ethnic group that came to America and assimilated.
     America has the world's 4th largest montagnard population.  The largest concentration of montagnards (H'mong and others) appears to be in southern China, about 4 1/2 million.  Vietnam has the next largest population, followed by Laos.  America now has close to a half a million montagnards, more than Thailand or Cambodia.  The largest group is the H'mong, both outside of Southeast Asia and in their homeland as well.  France has the second largest montagnard population after America. 
     Today, montaganrds are scattered practically all over.  A sad state of affairs.  They have been discriminated against for centuries in every place where they lived.  They had been promised autonomy, independence, but none of the promises were ever kept.  In their original homelands they have been displaced and in some cases, have been subjected to genocide.  The Vietnamese have been only too glad to get rid of them and allow them to leave the country.  Their history and plight is very similar to another people, in another part of the world, the Kurds in the Middle East.

Failed Revolts, Resistance, and Abandonment

     During the French Indochina War, the French recruited and employed 13 battalions of montagnards or degars, as they were also called.  The French battalions consist of anywhere from 500 to 600 men, so in all, the French had about 7,000 montagnard/degar troops during the war.  Ho Chi Minh also used ethnic minorities, but not in as large numbers as the French.  Both the communists and the French promised the montagnards a better life, autonomy, ability to self govern and be left alone in their lands.  The communists especially stressed the fact that under their system, everyone was completely equal!
     The French also, as they did in all their colonies, allowed some of the "natives" to go to France and receive higher education.  So, there were montagnards who were educated in universities in France and were not your typical montagnard villagers in loincloths.  These "educated" montagnards became leaders of various groups and tried to unite all of the tribes. 
     When the French Indochina War ended, Vietnam was split in half and the montagnards never received their promised autonomy or any other thing that was promised by either side.  The leaders of various groups of montagnards were very upset and formed a united front that was initially called BAJARAKA, a name made up of the first letters of all the tribes such as Bahar, Jarai, Rhade, etc.  A revolt against the oppressive and unfair South Vietnamese regime took place in 1958 and failed.  There just weren't enough armed montagnards to make any difference.  When the war ended, the montagnards were disarmed, even their crossbows and spears were declared illegal even though they  needed those weapons to hunt, to feed themselves!  All the leaders were jailed for a six year term and the rest of the rebels were either jailed or sent back into the hills, unarmed!
     The U.S. began to recruit and train the montagnards in earnest in the early 1960s, a couple of years after the failed revolt.  U.S. also promised the montagnards autonomy, at the very least, credible representation in the Vietnamese Assembly and key government appointments in their home territory.  As explained in the previous blogs, the relationship between the Americans and the montagnards became very close, thanks to those who lived among them and showed them that Americans were not like French or the Vietnamese.  By the mid 1960s, just in the central part of the highlands alone, in Rhade country, we had trained and equipped close to 20,000 montagnards that were organized in the elite Mobile Strike Forces and Mobile Guerrilla Forces, not to mention the irregular CIDGs.  The Mobile Strike Forces and Mobile Guerrilla Forces were by far the best indigenous fighting units in Vietnam, better than any South Vietnamese (ARVN) units, even their elite paratroop and Ranger units could not hold a candle to these U.S. trained and led units.
     Six years after the BAJARAKA leaders were jailed, they were released by the South Vietnamese government.  The determined leaders once again formed an organization, this time they called it FULRO (Front Unifie de Lutte de Races Opprimee), which basically meant that it was a "united front for struggle of oppressed races."  In September of 1964 FULRO launched a revolt against the South Vietnamese government in the Central Highlands led by Rhade tribe.  Some Vietnamese troops were killed and the Rhade marched on the capital of the province, Ban Me Thout.  There is no doubt that they would have taken the capital without much problem, but there would have been more bloodshed.  It was due to the brave efforts of the U.S. Special Forces officers who risked their own lives and intervened.  They convinced the Rhade to give up the revolt before any more violence took place.  The Rhade, trusting their American friends, lay down their arms and stopped the revolt.
     The South Vietnamese insisted in "punishing" the responsible parties, but the U.S. intervened on their behalf and a compromise of sorts was struck.  Although some of the leaders of the revolt paid for their actions by getting jailed, there was no bloodbath.  The war in Vietnam continued and the montagnards continued to serve the Americans bravely and loyally.  The montagnards had almost a childish trust in Americans!  By the time America began to pull out and the so-called "vietnamization" took place, we were fielding 40,000 montagnards as Mike Forces, Strike Forces, Mobile Guerrillas, etc.  The Vietnamese tried to take over command of these units but it did not work, so they decided to disarm them.  But that didn't work either.  The montagnards held on to their arms and began to simply disappear, fade into the bush, so-to-speak.  Mostly, complete units would just disappear, intact with arms.  In April of 1975, the ARVN (Army of Republic of South Vietnam) disgracefully took to their heels, abandoning their weapons and running helter-skelter as the NVA advanced on Saigon.  The montagnards just simply went into the hills.
     What the American public doesn't know is that the montagnards continued their fight against the communists!  Word began to reach the outside world through Thailand that the montagnards were seeking support.  They were desperately trying to contact their American friends, they needed ammunition and more arms to fight the communists!  Obviously the US Special Forces trained them well.  The  former Mike Forces and Mobile Guerrillas fought on until they completely ran out of ammunition and supplies!  They fought on by stealing and taking arms and ammunition from the Vietnamese soldiers that they killed, but that couldn't last forever. The last known montagnard resistance group lay down its arms and gave up to the communists in 1992!  Seventeen years after the fall of Saigon!  It was a former Rhade Mike Force unit!  They were a tired and hungry bunch in tattered uniforms and worn out weapons and completely out of ammunition!  Some of them still proudly wore the old Mike Force shoulder patches on their tattered uniforms!  Talk about fighting to the last bullet!
     Very simply put, the sad truth is that we abandoned them.  We promised them freedom, autonomy, something that we constantly say that we treasure so much.  Yet, after all the words and promises, we simply left them in a country whose majority population was hostile to them for thousands of years!  Even after we abandoned them, they tried to fight on, and when they could, sent word out that they needed help.  We simply turned a blind eye to what was going on. After all, how many of us had heard of their struggles on the evening news?  How many had even heard about the montagnards fighting the Vietnamese back in the 1980s and 1990s?  The media that professes to be so fair and impartial, simply refused to cover any of those stories.  They just weren't "sexy" or newsworthy by their account.  They chose to believe the Vietnamese government party line that these "rebel" montagnards were nothing but bandits. They were more interested in endangered gorillas in Uganda or chimpanzees in Kenya, the plight of the chimps made for a much better story. 

The Montagnards - 2

     Of the American military and civilian personnel, the Army Special Forces and CIA (paramilitary) and AID types were not the only ones that came into contact with the montagnards, or the 'yards, as some called them.  Most of the Marine and Army units in the Central Highlands region had some contact with montaganards, since the 'yards were the primary residents of the area.  However, all of the other American units lived in large military camps confined to Americans only.  Locals who worked in the camp came in the morning and left in the evening.  The contact these American conventional troops had with the montagnards was minimal and not personal.  On the contrary, the Special Forces and the CIA paramilitary personnel lived side by side with the 'yards, trained them, and led them in battle, and not only got to know them intimately, but became very close.
     The montagnards had a ceremony similar to native American ceremony of becoming "blood brothers."  Unlike the native American ceremony, no blood was shed in this version.  This ancient ceremony was conducted to create a tighter alliance and a gesture of true friendship and lifelong bond.  The montagnard and the non-montagnard subject who were to become "brothers" performed the ceremony by stripping off all "modern" clothing and donning colorful loincloths.  A "medicine man" or shaman conducted the ceremony and jars of rice beer were brought in for the occasion.  After incantations and other ritualistic performances, everyone consumed rice beer and a brass ring bracelet was presented to the non-montagnard, signifying that he was now a montagnard! 
     Some individuals who became "brothers" with several montagnards ended up wearing multiple bracelets.  Normally, most had only one brass ring bracelet.  It was considered a great honor to have undergone this ceremony and earned a brass ring bracelet.  It also assured that the one with a bracelet had the loyalty and friendship of all montagnards!  The Special Forces soldiers and CIA officers who earned these bracelets were rightfully, very proud of them.
     The main montagnard tribes that were recruited and worked for Americans were the H'mong in Laos and Vietnam, and the five main groups in the Central Highlands of Vietnam.  These were, going from north to south, the Bahnar, Jarai, Rhade, M'Nong, and Koho.  There were, of course, many others, but these were the main larger groups of montagnards employed by Americans.  The 'yards were organized at first as CIDG type paramilitary units.  But this was expanded to Mobile Guerrilla Forces and the Mobile Strike Forces which were much more structured and were like regular military units with ranks, etc.  They were also used in much smaller units by both the Special Forces and CIA for SOG (Studies and Observation Group) Recon Teams and as PRUs (Provincial Reconnaissance Units).  SOG Recon Teams were led predominantly by Army Special Forces, however, there were Marine and Navy (SEALs) volunteers in this top secret organization.  Although dominated by the Army Special Forces, it was nevertheless an inter-service group. The indigenous personnel were mostly montagnards or Nungs.  However, there were some Cambodians and Laotians as well, used for infiltration into those countries.
     The montagnards were used not only as organized units, trained and led my US personnel, but also as guides hired from a local village.  Sometimes when operating in an area that was not familiar to the montagnards of the unit, a local guide from a smaller tribe was hired to lead the patrols.  These local guides were, of course, not uniformed, but usually were dressed in loincloths and armed with crossbows.  They served exactly as the Indian Scouts did during the Indian Wars in the American West.  After they performed their services, they were paid off and sent home.
     The montagnards and Nungs were the first non-US personnel that underwent US Army parachute training in Vietnam.  Special Forces set up a jump school and started qualifying the montagnards and Nungs who were in Mobile Guerrilla Forces and Mike Forces.  Theoretically the Republic of Vietnam paratroopers were also U.S. qualified since it was the U.S. Army MAAG (Military Assistance and Advisory Group) that set up their jump schools and in fact, continued to monitor the training.  In other words, the Vietnamese qualification program for parachute training was identical to the U.S. program.  However, the Vietnamese awarded their own parachute badges to their personnel. 
     Initially when we qualified the Nungs and the montagnards, we intended to award them Vietnamese parachute badges.  But, when the Vietnamese got wind of it, they insisted that all indigenous troops would have to go through "their" jump school before receiving qualifying badges.  This was too much of a hassle, and we knew where it would lead, with demands of money, etc.  So we instead awarded the Nungs and the montagnards U.S. parachute badges, which they rightfully earned.  This created an unexpected bonus, so to speak.  The Nungs and the montagnards were extremely proud of their "American" jump wings and the esprit de corps soared!  The newly qualified troopers would strut around with their "American" jump wings just as a newly qualified 18 year old American paratrooper or a freshly minted Marine would!  The 'yards and the Nungs would make derisive comments about the Vietnamese jump wings whenever they ran across Vietnamese paratroopers.  In Special Forces camps, where there were the Vietnamese counterpart LLDBs (Vietnamese Special Forces), the Nung and the 'yard paratroopers looked down their noses at the RVN LLDBs!
     During the Vietnam War, there was only one official combat parachute drop conducted by the U.S. military.  It was the so-called Operation Junction City in which the 173rd Airborne Brigade made a mass daylight jump, without meeting any enemy resistance.  There were many smaller drops made by platoon size units, namely the Pathfinders who jumped into some hot areas to set up landing zones for helicopters. There were many "classified" jumps made by Special Forces and SOG, but they were not registered because they were classified.  For instance, Special Forces made a combat drop in Laos in 1960 during the classified "White Star" mission.  Credit for the combat jump was given only recently. Sadly, many of the veterans of that jump have since died, never receiving due credit.
     In contrast, the Mobile Guerrilla Forces and the Mike Forces, led by U.S. Special Forces soldiers, made numerous combat jumps at night, under hostile enemy fire!  However, they were not given credit for it because they were not "U.S. military units."  It didn't matter that they were completely a product of U.S.; organized, financed, trained, and led by U. S. personnel, which by any standards would make them a U.S. unit.  The fact that they were not U.S. citizens or residents disqualified them, and their efforts were ignored.  Some of our military regulations and bureaucratic red tape can be incredibly byzantine and mind numbing! It was only recently, about a decade ago, that the Pentagon finally decided that credit would be given where it was due and those night time drops by the Mobile Guerrilla Forces and Mike Forces led by American soldiers, have been designated as U.S. combat parachute operations!
    

The Montagnards

     The montagnards, a name that was given to them by the French (which means "mountain people"), have had a long history of being abused, discriminated against, and generally mistreated by the majority population in Vietnam.  Originally they were the main inhabitants of the Indochinese peninsula.  However, they were pushed out by the newly arrived people who gradually took all of their land and forced them into the Highlands of Vietnam and Laos, where most Vietnamese and Laotians do not want to live.  Sort of like what happened to the Ainu on the Japanese islands, and, what happened to our native population here in America.
     They had no rights what so ever.  They had no representation in the Vietnamese government, and periodically even their "badlands," were taken away by Vietnamese settlers.  When a large influx of refugees arrived from North Vietnam and the government didn't know what to do with them, they simply dumped them in the Highlands, with no regard to the montagnards, who these new refugees displaced!  The Vietnamese called the montagnards moi, which means animal or creature!  Some Vietnamese who lived in urban areas believed that the montagnards, the moi, had tails like monkeys!  With such negative views and discrimination practiced by the general population,  you can just imagine what it was like for the montagnards, the original inhabitants of the Indochinese peninsula!
     During the French Indochina War, both the French and the Viet Minh (communists) recruited the montagnard tribes to fight for their side.  Both sides promised the montagnards autonomy after "they" won the war.  They promised them all sorts of things.  The communists naturally promised them complete equality, since they were promoting a classless society anyway.  So, there were montagnards that fought for Ho Chi Minh and the communists as well as the French.  Interestingly, there were more that fought for the French.  The French raised complete battalions of montagnards, trained them in modern warfare, while Ho Chi Minh used them mostly as scouts.  Once the French were gone, the montagnards were left in a limbo.  The country was divided in half.  Since most of the Vietnamese Central Highlands are in the South, most montagnard tribes ended up in the south under the corrupt regime of the South Vietnamese, who called them moi!  The montagnards' salvation, or so they thought, were the newly arrived Americans.
     The CIA was the first to utilize montagnards for their needs.  When the Army Special Forces appeared on the scene in the late 50s and early 60s, they immediately began to recruit and train the montagnards in the Highlands for the CIDG (Civilian Irregular Defense Group) program even before it was called by that name.  It seemed that the little dark skinned montagnards were naturals as jungle fighters.  Having been abused and pushed around by the Vietnamese all these years, they were only too glad to take up arms and be trained by Americans to defend themselves against the VC (Viet Cong), after all VC were Vietnamese!  Although, there were communist montagnards as well.
     The Special Forces discovered that there were still quite a few montagnards who were veterans of the French Indochina War and these were the ones that were generally picked to be the leaders, the NCOs and officers of the newly formed montagnard companies, battalions, and even regiments.  The difficulty in training them for modern warfare was mainly with the younger montagnards who had no previous training.  Since they were illiterate, it was sometimes very difficult to convey certain ideas and concepts.  For example, how do you teach someone to handle a mortar, to elevate or lower the mortar tube a specific number.  If you told the montagnard to lower the mortar or raise it by 150, he would have no idea what you were talking about, since montagnards did not have a numerical system, or any other kind of written system!  Therefore, numbers meant nothing to them!  It is truly a credit to the ingenuity of the American Special Forces soldiers to have developed various systems to teach the montagnards how to raise or lower the mortar tube the required amount.  I won't go into details, suffice it to say that a system was developed whereby a string with different colored knots was used to designate numbers.
     The largest montagnard group is known as H'mong, also as Meo tribe.  At one time, before the war, it is said that there were several million H'mong scattered throughout Vietnam, Laos, and even Thailand.  There are various H'mong tribes known as Blue H'mongs, White H'mongs, etc., based on the color or pattern of the material in their clothing that they preferred.  The largest H'mong group resided in the Highlands of Laos, and this is the group that CIA had worked with from the earliest days and particularly during the so-called "Secret War" that took place in the 1960s.  CIA sponsored Mobile Guerrilla units of H'mong tribesmen were constantly infiltrated into Laos to fight the Pathet Lao.  The Special Forces trained the H'mong as well as montagnard tribes in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, notably the Rhade and Koho tribes and had almost 10,000 montagnards that were well trained and armed. 
     Once the montagnards received military training and got the "hang of things," so to speak, it seemed there was no limit.  The Mobile Guerrilla Forces (MGFs)and the Mobile Strike Forces (Mike Forces) were all airborne trained!  Special Forces started a jump school (parachute training) and qualified the montagnard units!  Considering that some of them had never been even been in an aircraft, it is amazing how quickly they accepted and adapted to the modern concept of parachuting out of an airplane!  We had more difficulty with some of the Cambodians and Laotians, getting them to jump out of an airplane, than with the montagnards.
     As I alluded earlier, only the Chinese Nungs were superior in their ability to learn methods of modern warfare than the montagnards.  But considering the society from which they came, the fact that most of them fought with crossbows and spears before we introduced them to modern weaponry, it is amazing how easily and quickly they became accomplished in their use!  The montagnards loved the M1 and M2 carbines with which most of them were armed, the carbine was light, highly portable, and in the jungles, where shooting distances sometimes were measured in feet, the relative low power of the carbine's ammunition was not a problem.  Later, as the war dragged on and the M-16 was introduced, they took to the new "black gun" just as easily.
     Depending on the tribe, most of the montagnards had dark skins, however, there were many that were lighter skinned.  Some could pass for a Vietnamese or a Nung.  But majority were dark skinned, one of the reasons that the Vietnamese called them moi.
     The montagnards "took" to the American Special Forces quite readily.  There were a number reasons for that.  For one thing, the Special Forces A Team lived with the montagnards, away from urban areas or large military bases.  A camp was set up and 12 Americans moved in and had the montagnards and their families move into the camp as well.  They all lived under same conditions!  Another unexpected factor that drew the montagnards closer to Americans was the fact that we had dark skinned soldiers, namely African-Americans.  The montagnards were fascinated by the African-Americans and would gleefully point at them and then themselves and say "same," meaning that they were dark skinned as well.  It wasn't long before African-American soldiers were referred to as "big montagnards" by the montagnards themselves!  So, to them, since Americans treated all skin types equally, we must be OK and could be trusted.  In that regard, they were like children and trusted us completely without any reservations!

The Nungs - 2

     There used to be a special relationship between the US Army Special Forces and CIA.  Considering the background of both organizations, it is quite understandable.  During World War Two, the primary U.S. intelligence organization was what was known as the Office of Strategic Services, the OSS.  The OSS, unlike the CIA of today, was a paramilitary organization, their field officers mostly held commissions in the US Army, although there were notable officers from the Marines and the Navy.   Shortly after World War Two, the OSS was disbanded and in 1947, a new civilian organization called the Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA was formed.  Essentially, the CIA was formed with the civilian component of the old OSS.  Of course new employees were hired and the CIA still retained a component that was paramilitary.  But the paramilitary part was very small, much smaller than it was during OSS days.  The military component of OSS was handed over to the US Army.  Most of the veterans of the OSS either became civilians or if they stayed in the military, scattered to various units. 
     During Korean War, it was quickly discovered that something like the old OSS, an unconventional unit was desperately needed.  At first an Army Airborne Ranger unit was mobilized.  However, it was a conventional unit and did not fill the need.  The Airborne Rangers were demobilized and a new army unit was formed, the Special Forces.  The infant Special Forces participated in the closing days of the Korean War, training guerrilla units and conducting unconventional warfare under the auspices of the 8th Army as the Army Unit 8240.  The young CIA was heavily involved in the operation of the Army Unit 8240.
     Quite naturally, when we became involved in Vietnam, the first U.S. military units there were the Army Special Forces, and, of course, CIA was very much in presence.  It was only a natural progression for CIA to employ the Special Forces for various projects.  After all, it had been less than 20 years since as OSS, they were all working together, and only a couple of years since the Korean War!  The CIA had been employing Nungs as body guards before Special Forces started doing the same.  The CIA had also employed the Nungs in military formations, company sized units that were used to infiltrate into Cambodia and Laos.  In order to train the Nungs, CIA used Special Forces soldiers as cadre.  So, the Special Forces started using Nungs as body guards first, but quickly expanded their use to other military needs.
     Because Special Forces A teams were always in isolated areas, surrounded by native Vietnamese or hill tribesmen, if they needed assistance when attacked by a large enemy force, it was very difficult to get that help!  Military bureaucracy made things very cumbersome and a unit had to get special permission from headquarters, etc., before they could dispatch help to a besieged Special Forces camp.  Sometimes, that permission never came!  That is what happened at Long Vei Special Forces camp near Khe Sanh.  They were overrun by North Vietnamese before any help could reach them.  So, a special Mobile Strike Force, Mike Force, was formed with Nungs.  This Mike Force was used to help besieged Special Forces camps in the area.  The program was so successful that it was expanded to five large Mobile Strike Forces, located in five military zones in Vietnam.  These were large units, some almost regimental size, made of Nungs in some areas, but with Montagnards in others.  There were also smaller company and battalion sized Mike Forces scattered throughout.
     Along with Mike Forces, there were the Mobile Guerrilla Forces, the MGFs.  These were units specifically formed and trained to fight as guerrillas in enemy territory.  Because of the weird political nature of Vietnam War, we were not allowed to go into Laos and Cambodia after the North Vietnamese who used those countries as sanctuaries.  So, we used Mobile Guerrilla Forces, made up of Chinese Nungs, various Montagnard tribesmen, Cambodians, and Laotians.  After all, they were not Americans, so we weren't breaking any "rules."  Of course the US Special Forces soldiers that led these units had to be very careful not to get captured!  They dressed exactly like the MGF members, and generally were indistinguishable from other members of the Mobile Guerrilla Forces, except that they were usually much taller.  But that's another story!
     We learned quickly that the Nungs were by far the best.  The Montagnards were as brave and loyal, but they lacked the military know how, despite training, since anything modern did not come naturally to them.  But that will be discussed later.  The Cambodians and Laotians were iffy at best.  Some were good, others not so good.  In case of the incident at Long Vei, the closest Mike Force was a Laotian unit led by U.S. Special Forces NCOs.  The Laotians balked at fighting a superior North Vietnamese force and as a result, of the two Americans that led the force, one was killed and another captured.  That would not have happened if that Mike Force was made up of Nungs!
     When the so-called Vietnam-ization took place, all these irregular units were turned over to the Vietnamese.  The Vietnamese insisted that they handle all the pay and other responsibilities.  Everyone knew what was going to happen.  The Nungs (as well as the Montagnards) refused to work for the Vietnamese.  The Nungs left en mass!  Some of the Nungs were airlifted by CIA to other regions, most notably to the Golden Triangle region of Burma, Thailand, and China.  Some of the Nungs had come from that region in their younger days.  In 1949, some Koumintang (Nationalist Chinese Army) units settled in the Golden Triangle region and were engaged in the opium trade.  No doubt there were Nungs in that group.  Eventually the Chinese either moved out or were absorbed by the people in the region, namely the Shan people.  So, the fact that some of them chose to return to that area is not surprising.
     There were many CIA officers as well as Special Forces soldiers who worked desperately to get the Nungs out of Vietnam.  Some managed to get out.  Others managed to escape later, pretending to be simply ethnic Chinese of Vietnam.  There always was a large ethnic Chinese population in Vietnam, the large and popular Cholon district of Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) is Chinese!  So, there are Nungs in America.  However, sadly, the vast majority that fought so bravely and loyally for Americans all those years, have disappeared.  The North Vietnamese possibly hated the Nungs even more than the South Vietnamese, so no doubt any Nung who worked for Americans was shot.  I don't think they wasted any time with Nungs trying to re-educate them in camps!
     The Chinese Nungs, a proud people with a distinguished history of bravery and loyalty in battle.  Perhaps some day they will resurface again.  You cannot squash or eliminate people like that.  They somehow always manage to survive.

The Nungs

     Except for some anthropologists who specialized in Southeast Asia, very few people had heard of an ethnic group called Nungs that resides in Indochina, prior to the Vietnam War.  During our involvement in that war, the name Nung became known to some, particularly those who were familiar with the operations of our Army Special Forces in Vietnam.  What little the public knows about the Nungs is mostly that they were mercenary fighters who fought for the U.S. Special Forces.  Other than that, the general consensus was/is that they were good fighters, loyal to the U.S., and were ethnic Chineses.  That's about it.
     There is, of course, much more to the Nung story.  There is also some confusion in identifying exactly who they are.  There are, in fact, several ethnic groups that were called Nungs.   There are the Thai Nungs, as well as various Tho people (another name for Nungs).  The particular group of Chinese Nungs that fought as mercenaries for the U.S. were a separate group.  The name Nung was given to all of these ethnic Chinese by the French who for political reasons, did not want to classify them as Chinese, instead they called them by the Cantonese name of Nung, which means farmer, since most of them were farmers!  There are said to be over all, more than a million Nungs in several groups scattered throughout Indochinese peninsula, most concentrated in the northeast corner of Vietnam.  However, the Nung group that fought for the U.S. was a separate group that migrated to South Vietnam around 1954.
     All of the Nungs have always had a reputation for being fierce fighters.  Some compare them to the Ghurkas, a much better known Asian warrior group.  Historically, Nungs  have fought for various employers as mercenaries for a long time.  Sun Yat Sen, hired Nungs to fight for the newly formed Nationalist China, and in fact, some of the best fighting units of Nationalist China were made up of Nungs. 
     The popular version of modern Nung history, in what was South Vietnam, is that some 50,000 Nungs, led by a Colonel Vong A Sang, a former Nationalist Chinese Army Colonel, migrated to South Vietnam when Ho Chi Minh started to take over the northern part of that country.  The 50,000 Nungs consisted of men, women, and children, an entire population of Nungs that supposedly were former Nationalist Chinese Army members who fled mainland China in 1949 when Mao and the communists took over.  They first came to the northeastern part of Vietnam where other Nungs were already settled.  But when Ho and the communist Viet Minh began to take over the country, supposedly, Colonel Vong A Sang assembled his group, as well as other Nungs who joined him, and migrated to the south.
     No doubt there is some truth in this story.  But then again, like all anecdotal accounts of history, this particular version may be made up of some half truths as well as pure fiction, who knows.  However, it does sound very interesting and could make a good novel or a movie! Whatever the case, the Chinese Nungs who fought for the U.S. Army Special Forces were exceptional soldiers, brave and completely loyal to Americans.  Unfortunately they did not get along with the Vietnamese.  In fact, the Nungs hated the Vietnamese and would get upset when some unknowing American would confuse them with the Vietnamese!  The feeling was mutual, the Vietnamese did not care for the Nungs either!
     Many Americans don't realize that we had been involved in Vietnam much earlier than reported by the media.  The first U.S. military "observers" were sent to Vietnam as early as 1954, even before the French got thrown out of that country.  One of the main reasons for the formation of the 1st Special Forces Group on Okinawa in 1957 was because of our interest and involvement in Vietnam!  By 1958 we were sending military "advisors" and "trainers" both from the 1st Special Forces Group on Okinawa and the 77th Special Forces Group out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  The first Special Forces battle casualty in Vietnam was a Captain from the 77th who was killed on a patrol in 1958.  His death was not recognized as combat related death until some 35 years later!  The family was told he had died in a training accident, a popular explanation given in those days when someone was killed on a classified operation!
     Contrast it with today's coverage of "classified" operations such as the "super secret" operation to get Osama Bin Laden.  In less than a year after the "super secret" operation, a book was published and a movie was made with a complete list of participants of the supposed "super secret" Navy SEAL Team.   Yes, SEAL Team 6 that participated in that operation is supposed to be the most "hush-hush" unit in the US Navy!  Thankfully the names of the Army's Special Operations Aviation (Blackhawk pilots and crew) members as well as the Army's "other" members who participated in the raid were not divulged!  What is this need to tell everyone, everything!?! At least no one posted comments on their "tweeter" account during the operation!
     In April of 1962, for the first time the deaths of two Special Forces soldiers was recognized as combat related and there was media coverage on the incidents.  The two Special Forces NCOs were killed by their own men (Vietnamese that they were training and leading), at an isolated Special Forces camp.  It was discovered that the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDGs) that were trained and led by the twelve man Special Forces team was heavily infiltrated by Viet Cong (VC) and the VC had turned their guns on the Americans with the help of other VC that attacked the camp. 
     Typically, a twelve man Special Forces team would find itself at an isolated camp, training and leading a CIDG unit that could be anywhere from 150 to 500 man strength.  No matter how you looked at it, Americans were vastly outnumbered by non-Americans at locations that were hours away (by air!) from friendly units!  In case of Vietnamese villagers that we were recruiting and training, we could never tell who was a VC sympathizer or possibly even a hard core VC!  Something had to be done to prevent another incident such as the one that had taken place.
     Since our early involvement in Vietnam, we had come in contact with Nungs who had offered their services to us.  We knew that they were fierce fighters, strong anti communists, and hated Vietnamese!  The solution was to hire Nung body guards.  Initially Special Forces camps hired small units of Nungs (usually a platoon size) to provide security for camps, to watch the backs of the Americans.  The Nungs proved to be completely trustworthy and incidents of CIDGs turning on Americans did not occur again.  The Nungs were not only disliked by the Vietnamese, but feared!  The Nung security program was so successful that we decided to expand it and use the Nungs for other combat related use.  By mid 1960s, the Nungs were firmly established as part of the U.S.Special Forces operations in Vietnam.
    

"Too Little, Too Late" - Perhaps

     Most recently Pentagon announced that 400 U.S. military "trainers" with unspecified number of support troops are being sent to Syria to help train Syrian rebels.  The announcement did not say just who these "trainers" were, whether they were Army, Navy, or Marines.  Knowing how Pentagon operates, it usually requires at least three support personnel for each combat or in this case, "trainer" personnel, so I imagine the entire group is about twelve hundred or so U.S. troops.
     Frankly, I am somewhat  puzzled by this move at this stage of the game in Syria.  I hope we have been able to identify "good guys" from the bad, since among the so-called rebels, there are not only ISIS or ISIL, but Hamas, and possibly other extremist groups including Al Qaeda.  Supposedly we are going to help the "not-so-radical" rebels, let's hope so!  My puzzlement over this latest move by Pentagon is based on the fact that the civil war in Syria has been going on for almost four years, since the so called "Arab Spring" of 2011.  As I recall, there was a lot of indecision on the part of Washington as to what to do, whether to provide air support or not, create a no fly zone, etc.  There were those who insisted from the beginning that we should immediately throw our support for the rebels, after identifying the ones that are not radical.  Senator John McCain was one who felt that we should even put boots on the ground.  He was, of course, ridiculed by the media along with other "hawks" who insisted that we help the rebels.  However, since it appeared that majority in Washington did not want to do anything, we did not take action.  Now, almost four years later, and with ISIS becoming a serious threat in Iraq, we are sending "trainers" to Syria!
     What exactly are we trying to accomplish in Syria?  Are we training these "good" rebels to topple the government or to fight ISIS and Hamas?  Does the White House and Pentagon seriously think that 400 "trainers" with support personnel will work magic and turn the tide of the civil war or eliminate ISIS?  To me, it seems like a lame gesture just to show that we tried to do something!  It is sort of like what Secretary of State John Kerry just did when he visited Paris and laid a wreath and kissed the French President.  We could have made a much better showing by participating in the Solidarity March that took place a week earlier, but we sent no one from Washington, we couldn't be bothered then.  Now, some six days later, Kerry shows up to lay a wreath and smooch Francois Hollande on both cheeks.  It is akin to shedding crocodile tears! I seem to be missing the whole point in this diplomatic exercise, a simple formal apology would have been better in my view!  I am also missing the point of our sending "trainers" to Syria now.
     I fail to see the purpose of sending military "trainers" to Syria at this late stage.  If the purpose is to train them to fight ISIS, which I suspect is the real reason, then it is a very poorly hatched plan and a short sighted goal.  In order to achieve any sort of success, we not only have to train the rebels, but continue to train and lead them in battle.  They will not be able to defeat ISIS on their own, ISIS has better training and support!  So, to be successful, we will have to stay in Syria and continue with this counter - counter insurgency operation.  The minute we step out, leave the area, the whole process will fall apart! The only way this can work is if we continue to support the rebels, provide training and material, as much as needed.  If more troops are needed, then we should provide more troops.  So that means we have to be committed and keep our troops (trainers) in Syria for the duration and increase their numbers if needed, until ISIS is cleared out of the region.  Are we willing to do that?  Are we willing to commit for the duration?  Not likely.
     I know that I sound very callous and pessimistic, but I believe we are just wasting more money and possibly American lives.  What will emerge from this exercise is that we will pour-in millions and millions of dollars and equipment, possibly lose some lives, and in the end not accomplish our goal.  We will make some rebels rich, no doubt some of the rebel leaders will become "former" rebels who will be living as millionaires elsewhere, may be even in America! 
     In order to succeed in these counter insurgency efforts, we have to be committed for the duration, whatever it takes to complete the task.  We have not shown that we are willing to do that, not as a country or as a government.  Recent history (post World War Two) shows that we do not have the sticking power, the willingness to see things through to the end.  We bailed out of Vietnam, as we are trying to do in Iraq and Afghanistan, which no doubt we will do regardless of consequences. 
     During our previously "longest" war, Ho Chi Minh often said to his followers that all they needed to do was wait us out, that we did not have the patience nor the willingness to see things to the end.  He said something to the effect that, "Americans count time in hours and days while we Vietnamese count time in years and decades."  It may sound a bit like something from a fortune cookie, but who knows, may be Ho had something there!

Land of "Baksheesh" and "Wasta"

     Back in the 1980s, in a casual conversation with a friend, I commented about how rampant corruption was in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), that the ARVN was literally paralyzed with corruption, nothing could be done without pay-offs, etc.  My friend, a career Army officer who had served abroad in many countries, laughed at my remark and said, essentially, "you haven't seen graft and corruption until you've been to an Arab country!"
     Years later, I spent a three year tour in Egypt, and I got a glimpse of that graft and corruption that my friend referred to in our conversation of long ago.  In Snap Shots, in Chapter 19 called "Mohi, Zaki and Shahir," I describe an incident in which my friend Shahir, a Coptic Christian, applied for a permit to purchase a shotgun when his old shotgun broke down. The policeman told him that he would not approve his permit because he was a Christian, and that was that!  Fortunately, Shahir was able to get his broken shotgun fixed and didn't need to buy a new gun.  Later I mentioned to our mutual friend Zaki (a Muslim) that he should perhaps get another shotgun just in case his old gun broke down.  I said surely he wouldn't have problems since he was a Muslim.  Zaki shook his head and said he would be refused a permit as well, because he didn't have wasta (clout, connections, "juice"), besides, he would have to pay a lot of baksheesh (bribe, tip, pay off) to different officials, and there still wouldn't be any guarantee that he would get his permit!
     Both Shahir and Zaki were well to do, only well to do people can afford to go hunting in Egypt.  Yet, because they didn't have wasta, they always had to pay baksheesh to get anything done, anything from getting something simple like a telephone line in the house to driver's license!  Having diplomatic status, I was immune to most of that graft that was taking place.  However, I could see what my friends, those without "special status" had to put up with in their daily lives.  Graft and corruption began with the President of the country and worked its way down to the lowest ranking official in the government.  Of course, there were and are honest individuals.  They are the ones that for the most part started the "Arab Spring Revolution" that toppled Hosni Mubarak and the establishment, only to be replaced by Muslim Brotherhood, which in turn has been replaced by the military!  I am told that corruption is even worst now!
     Shortly after we defeated Saddam Hussein's forces, the insurgents appeared and there was no Iraqi Army, not the old or the new!  Something had to be done to develop forces to combat the insurgents, forces other than US troops.  The US Army Special Forces was charged with developing a program that was very similar to the one that was run in Vietnam.  In other words, we were going to have Iraqi version of Mike Forces, Strike Forces, etc.  Within a short space of time we trained and led various "Commando" units that were very successful in combating the insurgents.  Just as in Vietnam, we trained, fed, paid, and led in combat these forces.  However, in a few years, just as we had to do in Vietnam, we turned over the command of these "Commando" units to the Iraqis.  It didn't take long, less than a couple of months for them to completely destroy these units.  The soldiers went unpaid, some even unfed.  Most of the units were absorbed by the "new" Iraqi Ground Force Command.  In short they were no longer under US control and therefore, completely disintegrated!
     All of the captured weapons etc., were turned over to the new Iraqi forces.  At one point, over 400,000 AK47 and AKM type assault rifles were logged-in, each by serial number, when the weapons were captured.  They were stored in warehouses and guarded by Iraqi forces, those that we managed to retain from the old Iraqi army.  When we officially pulled our combat forces out, we turned over all of that equipment.  Guess what?  Out of 400,000 plus assault rifles, less than 10,000 were found in those warehouses!  The Iraqis simply shrugged their shoulders and said we must have made a mistake in our original inventory!
     Most young Iraqis who join the army or police force do so only to find employment, to get fed and receive pay.  Yet, they even get short changed in that area!  Many of the current Iraqi generals are known by their nicknames such as "chicken general" (the general who controls the chicken market in Iraq, chickens that are bought to feed troops, yet end up back on the market!) or "bread general" who controls the bread distribution, etc.  The corruption is so endemic and open that most people become blind to it!  The generals and government officials ride around in expensive luxury cars and live in fine houses while the troops are barely fed and the general population suffers!  That is, of course, unless you have wasta and can afford to pay baksheesh, in which case you can have a good life!  You can readily see how ISIS can thrive in such an environment!  They claim to offer the people an "out" from this seemingly endless reign of graft and corruption.
     It is no different in Afghanistan.  If anything, it may even be worst because Afghanistan and the Afghan society was never as developed as the Iraqi, it was always more backward, even before all these troubles.  The country is ruled by a former petty warlord in a government that is nothing but a loose coalition, temporary alliance, of different tribes that had been killing each other for generations!  The only reason there is some relative agreement among them is because Karzai is distributing the millions that he gets from the US, to keep the tribes off each others backs!  Of course he is keeping the lion's share, everyone knows that!  That is the prerogative of the leader of the pack, the "President."  Karzai's brother is making a fortune off opium, and other warlords are all given concessions for different businesses.  You don't get anything done in Afghanistan without wasta or baksheesh, it is like any other country in that region!  In Vietnam Ngo Dinh Diem used to hold meetings in which he gave out "concessions" to various officials, i.e., black market cigarettes, whiskey, etc.  It is no different in Afghanistan or Iraq for that matter.
     Sadly, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, just like in the old Republic of SouthVietnam, soldiers lack motivation.  After all, how motivated can you be when you are constantly short changed in your pay, fed inferior foods, and generally treated like crap!  Just like the ARVN before them, the ANA (Afghan National Army) and IGFC (Iraqi Ground Forces Command) lack leadership and motivation.  Soldiers pay "baksheesh" to their NCOs and officers, while generals pocket large sums of cash from payrolls!  Why would anyone fight for such a system of government?  If your family has wasta, then you don't have to serve in the military, you can always buy your way out of military service.  But if you are poor, you have no choice.
     The good fighting units that we created, the Afghan Commandos and the Iraqi Commando units have all been absorbed by their respective systems.  They are no longer the elite fighting units that they were.  They now lack leadership and motivation, and have become just like the rest of the ANA or IGFC!  In Vietnam, the Mike Forces and Strike Forces were simply disbanded, the South Vietnamese said they didn't need them (actually, they didn't trust them!), but in Afghanistan and Iraq, they were simply absorbed by other units.
     A sad state of affairs.  Don't think we didn't or don't know what was going on and what is still going on.  We're not that naïve or stupid!  Its just that the American public is not told what is going on.  After all, it is our money, the tax payers of America, that supports the lavish lifestyles of the generals and government officials of Afghanistan and Iraq!  The war against ISIS will be lost without our strong and complete participation, not just air strikes!  Conducting just air strikes sounds great.  It is so impersonal, no direct involvement, so to speak.  But it doesn't work that way.  We need boots on the ground.  Afghanistan is no better.  If we pull out completely, Taliban and Al Qaeda will return in force and take over the country!  Perhaps even ISIS will surface in Afghanistan!
     Most recently General Dempsey, our Joint Chief, declared that Pentagon had a specific plan to defeat ISIS.  Lets hopes so, let's hope its not just one of those "blowing smoke" PR statements, because Iraqi leaders surely do not have any plans except to get more money from the U.S!

Culture of Corruption

     In the last blog, I mentioned that for the most part, the only units in Vietnam that fought well, aside from U.S., were those that were led by U.S. personnel, such as the CIDGs (Civilian Irregular Defense Groups), Mike Forces (Mobile Strike Forces), PRUs (Provincial Reconnaissance Units), etc.  Of course there were exceptions and there were ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) and VN Marines that fought well, but, sadly, there weren't many.  It wasn't because the Vietnamese were incapable of being good soldiers, all you had to do was look at the NVA and VC, but it was simply that the Vietnamese units lacked leadership and corruption ran deep in the Vietnamese society.  Things such as commanders pocketing the payroll meant for soldiers was a very common practice, as well as selling off supplies that were meant for troops.  So basically, those in leadership position got "fat" off the war, while the common soldiers suffered!  Who would fight under such conditions?  If I was a Vietnamese soldier, I think it would have been very difficult for me to be motivated to fight for that country!
     In a typical US Special Forces camp, there was the US Special Forces "A" Detachment, 2 officers and 10 enlisted men.  This small unit was charged with training and leading either a CIDG or a Mike Force unit to keep a particular sector free of enemy, VC or NVA, and to gather intelligence.  The CIDGs or "Strikers" were composed of local Vietnamese villagers for the most part, while the Mike Force was made up of hill tribesmen such as the Meo or Hmong, the ethnic Chinese Nungs, and other groups.  Usually they were about the size of one or two infantry companies, sometimes infantry battalion size.  They were all completely trained and led by US Special Forces.  In this way, it was quite common for a young US Special Forces sergeant to end up being a company commander in combat!  However, there was always also an ARVN "counterpart" VNSF, the Vietnamese Special Forces team in camp.  The idea was that the Vietnamese Special Forces would learn from the US members on how to train and lead the irregular forces and ultimately take over when the US left.  As we all know, that never happened.  The VNSF, called Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDBs), rarely ventured outside of camp perimeter and were derisively referred to by some Americans as "Lousy Little Damn Bugouts," not exactly a complimentary nickname.
     Most US military personnel in Vietnam, especially combat units, had very little to do with the Vietnamese, so they were not exposed to the degree of corruption that existed in Vietnamese society in general and army in particular.  All of the irregular forces in Special Forces camps were completely supported by the US.  They were trained, armed, fed, led in combat, and paid by the US.  On pay days, a table was set up and the Vietnamese insisted that they handle the pay procedure so as to show the irregulars that it was Vietnam, after all, that was paying them.  Of course everyone knew that it was not so, but played the game any way.  However, we learned very quickly that we could not let the LLDBs handle the distribution of pay.  They would pocket most of it!  So, each pay day, at the pay table, an American sat next to the Vietnamese, to make sure there was no funny stuff going on!
     The irregular units fought very well, particularly the hill tribesmen and the Nungs.  They were extremely loyal to us and would openly declare that they were fighting for us, not the Vietnamese! Of course they were mercenaries. The US Special Forces members had to constantly keep an eye on the Vietnamese counterparts, the LLDBs, to keep pilfering and stealing to a minimum.  Quite often, the LLDBs would wait until all of the "Strikers" (Strike Force or CIDG members) were paid, then go around and collect "taxes"!  They couldn't do this with the Nungs or hill tribesmen, but they could intimidate their own villagers.  It was a constant battle.  Those camps that did not have VNSF counterparts were fortunate and did not have to put up with that stuff!
     One of the reasons that the Communists set up "reeducation" camps after they took over the country was because they were trying to come up with a way to break this pattern of culture of corruption.  It was the very same thing that Mao tried to do in China after he took over.  China may have had some success with their brutal "reeducation" process.  After all, they had over 60 years to try and break the culture of corruption.  However, with the recent economic growth and appearance of "rich" class, it is quite apparent that corruption is alive and well, although not as endemic as it was before.  Vietnam has not had as much time yet.  They've only been trying to change the "culture" for 40 years.
     It is extremely hard to break the pattern that has been in place for centuries!  It seems that the only way to do this is by drastic measures!  Education is the key, and it has to start early, from practically pre-school level.  It has to take place at school and at home!  Mao knew this and tried to change everything right from the start.  The cultural revolution was in response to the fact that change was too slow, there was still a lot of corruption in China.  Whether the cultural revolution helped or not is debatable, it certainly made life miserable for many.  But whatever the case, all of it was in part an attempt to break the pattern of deep rooted corruption in the culture. 
     The Chinese and the Vietnamese have managed to at least control the rampant corruption that used to exist.  After all, there is corruption in every society.  The developed countries are not exempt.  Almost daily we hear about cases of corruption involving individuals or organizations.  But, we do manage to control it to a point so that it does not completely dominate our lives!  Such is not the case in some parts of the world.  The middle east, in particular, is so steeped in corruption that even Mao's extreme measures would not work.

The Afghan and Iraqi Armies

     Our experience during World War Two with the Chinese Nationalist Army should have taught us something.  It should have taught us that no matter how much money we pour in, how much equipment we supply, and how much time we spend "training" the army, it will all be for naught if we also do not prepare the NCO and officer corps, and they are properly motivated.  As General Stilwell told the reporter, there is nothing wrong with the Chinese soldier.  If anything, he is disciplined, obedient, and brave when called upon to go into combat.  But without motivation and good NCOs or officers to lead them, the good soldier is really not worth much.  That is the main reason why there was such a dramatic difference between Chiang Kai Shek's army and Mao's army.  Mao's troops were not necessarily better trained and certainly not better equipped.  But they were led by competent NCOs and officers, and they were motivated, something that the Nationalist troops definitely lacked.
     Perhaps it was because we fought World War Two with our own troops and were not reliant on other nations' troops, whatever the case, we didn't seem to have paid all that much attention to the plight of the Chinese Nationalist Army.  During the Korean War, at the outset everyone was caught by surprise and took a beating from the North Koreans.  The South Koreans really did not have an army, they had an army that was in the process of being trained.  What they had was a bunch of untrained men armed with Japanese army weapons and mostly led my inexperienced NCOs and officers.  But it is amazing how a few months of OJT changed that "Korean Constabulary Army" into a solid Republic of Korea Army.  It took but three months, from the end of June until September to change the South Korean army into a viable force.  By the time the cease fire was signed three years later, the South Korean army was a battle hardened and battle tested fighting force, as good, if not better than the North Koreans!  Today, they are definitely better trained, equipped, motivated, and led by excellent NCO and officer corps.
     But after Korea, perhaps because the Koreans were able to field a good fighting force, we slipped back into thinking that we could simply "buy" a good fighting force by pouring in equipment and money.  In South Vietnam we spent astronomical amount of money and equipment on the ARVN, the Army of Republic of Vietnam.  However, during our entire time there, we were having problems getting the ARVN to perform on the battle field as they should have.  The problem?  The very same thing that happened with the Chinese Nationalist Army, lack of leadership!  The ARVN was always lacking in good NCOs and officers, and motivation was none existent.  Perhaps the biggest problem of all, just as with the Chinese Nationalists, was corruption in the leadership, which destroyed whatever morale the troops may have had.
     Yes, there were ARVN units that fought well.  There were good ARVN NCOs and officers.  But unfortunately there weren't enough.  There were Vietnamese Marine units that were advised by USMC officers that fought very well.  The same can be said of some ARVN Ranger units and Paratroop units.  They were invariably those units that had American "advisors" assigned to them.  Once the Americans were gone, they fell apart.  Yet, the NVA and VC fought well.  Why, because they had good leadership and were motivated, something that their counterparts in South Vietnamese military lacked!  Small wonder then that they crumbled like they did once we left!  The best non-American fighting units in Vietnam were those indigenous forces that were trained and led by US NCOs and officers.
     Now, we have been in Afghanistan for almost fourteen years and Iraq thirteen years.  Why is it that given the amount of time we were in those countries that we couldn't train a decent army?  Just how long does it take to train an army?  Six months? A year? Two years?  I find it absolutely mind boggling that after all that time, all that money, we still couldn't produce a decent field fighting force in those countries!  The new Iraqi Army, with all the fancy equipment, can't even handle a rag-tag bunch of extremists that call themselves the Islamic State!
     Again, it appears that the ISIS is well motivated whereas the Iraqi Army is not!  Corruption is rampant in the newly created Iraq, the Iraq that we created!  The same thing is true of Afghanistan.  Now some of the brass in Pentagon are saying that it will take us two to three years to train a fighting force in Iraq to fend for itself against ISIS.  Two to three years?  What have we been doing the past thirteen years?  If we couldn't do it in thirteen years, how are we going to do it in two to three years now?  As for Afghanistan, recently Karzai asked that we postpone withdrawing our troops, that we should remain longer!  Karzai, the former small time warlord, a tribal leader in the Northern Alliance, who has since become a multi-billionaire, is not about to let go of the cash cow!  He knows that as soon as we pull out completely, he will be out of power and Afghanistan will be in chaos, not that it isn't already.  Let's just say that it will be in a worst mess than it is now!
     I think we need to realize that in all of those cases where the military is inept even after all the money and equipment they receive, it has more to do with the corruption in the system than anything else.  We need to somehow "clean house" first, before we start building armies and go into that catch phrase, "nation building."  It does no good to "build nations" that have a corrupt foundation, where its leaders are all simply lining their pockets and exploiting the country!  In some cases, I believe it is not possible to change the culture of corruption in a country.  I believe that both Afghanistan and Iraq have existed for a long time with rampant corruption.  Their culture is so steeped in corruption that they know of no other way.  That is one reason why extremists thrive in that part of the world.  To the mostly illiterate and unsophisticated population, there seems to be no solution other than extremists way of "cleaning house," therefore you have the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and now ISIS, all claiming to "cleanse" the world of evil, which of course is the west first, then all non-believers!

Backing the Wrong Horse

     Those of you who follow my blogs may have noticed that from time to time I slip back and go over a topic that was previously covered.  I do this when I feel that I never actually covered the topic sufficiently in original blog and, the subject matter is important enough to deserve further discussion.  Such is the case with our government seemingly, constantly "backing the wrong horse," so to speak, in the international arena.
     In one of the earlier blogs I had what could be called an "what if?" series going back to World War Two era.  I think everyone who is familiar with that period in our history knows how we backed the Nationalist Chinese and their leader Chiang Kai Shek.  We poured millions and millions of dollars into Nationalist China, making their leaders some of the richest men in the world!  We gave them not only money, but tons of military hardware, which we ended up facing in Korea and Vietnam!  Chiang Kai Shek fielded one of the largest and best equipped armies in Asia, yet, he was unable to fend off the Japanese on his own, and later was run out of the country by the communist guerrilla army of Mao Tse Tung!
     There were many in the U.S. government who were against this unconditional support of the Nationalist Chinese.  Many knew how corrupt Chiang Kai Shek and his regime was, yet we continued to pour millions of dollars and arms and equipment into that dark hole.  What many are unaware of is that in 1944 we dispatched a special mission to the mountains of Yenan where Mao and his communist guerrillas were set up after escaping the Nationalists in that famous "Long March."  The special mission, called "Dixie Mission" was headed by Colonel David Barrett and a contingent of army officers.  On the civilian side, John Service, a State Department Foreign Service Officer represented the U.S. Embassy in Chungking, and was also a special observer and advisor to General Joseph Stilwell who was the U.S. Commanding General of CBI (China, Burma, and India Theater).  Stilwell, who knew Chiang Kai Shek very well and despised him, was responsible for the unflattering nickname of "peanut head" that was given to Chiang.
     The "Dixie Mission" lasted until 1947, well after the war ended.  Both Colonel Barrett and John Service came to know Mao, his deputy Chou En Lai, and the communist guerrillas very intimately.  After all, they lived with them in those mountains of Yenan for three years!  At the end of the mission, both Barrett and Service filed reports urging the U.S. government to support Mao and stop wasting money and effort on Chiang Kai Shek and his corrupt regime.  They said that Mao would win the civil war, even without our help and support and Chiang would lose despite all the money and equipment we poured in.  They insisted that Chinese communism was different from Soviet and that we had nothing to fear, the Chinese communists were not interested in world conquest, they wanted to get their country on its feet and rid of corruption that ruled for so many centuries!
     Of course, no one listened to Barrett and Service.  Both men's careers were ruined, they were tagged as communist sympathizers.  Shortly afterwards, things got even worst when Senator Joseph McCarthy started his infamous communist witch hunt.  McCarthy ruined so many lives!  Most of McCarthy's accusations were totally unfounded and based on lies!  Yet people listened to him!  Service was kicked out of the State Department and Barrett, who was due for promotion to Brigadier General never saw the star and took an early retirement.  At least Service fought to be reinstated and to prove his innocence.  He was eventually reinstated and given token assignments that never led to anything!
     As I said in the earlier blog.  What if?  What if Barrett's and Service's advice was followed and we supported Mao?  For one thing, there would never have been the Korean War.  It is very doubtful if Kim Il Sung and the Soviet Union would have risked the war with China on the northern border as our ally!  We would not have lost all those men and the terrible three years of warfare!  Indeed, what if!  Additionally, there would not have been the Vietnam War!  North Vietnam was primarily dependent on China's support both financially and for arms.  Without China's support, it is highly unlikely that Ho Chi Minh would have invaded the south.
     So much attention and publicity was given to General Douglas McArthur and his antics in the Pacific that General Joseph Stilwell was almost forgotten.  "Vinegar" Joe, as he was called was a terrific soldier who had the unenviable task of commanding a relatively small American army but charged with advising a much larger Chinese Nationalist Army.  Stilwell was fluent in Chinese, in fact he was a China scholar.  He knew China and Chinese very well and, therefore, knew just how corrupt and bad the Nationalists were. Yet, like the good soldier that he was, he followed Washington's orders (as disagreeable as they were to him) and tried his best to "advise" the Chinese, who would only listen to him when he withheld equipment and money unless they did as he advised.
     A reporter once asked him what his opinion was of the Chinese soldier.  Stilwell responded by saying that he thought the Chinese soldier was very good.  The average Chinese soldier was obedient, disciplined, and brave when called upon to go to battle.  However, Stilwell added, no soldier in the world can fight well without proper leadership from NCOs and officers.  He said that what the Nationalist Chinese Army lacked was good NCOs and officers.  There were plenty of good soldiers, but no NCOs or officers to lead them!  Unless the Nationalists developed a strong NCO and officer corps, their army would not be able to defeat anyone!
     The difference between the Nationalists and the communists  was that Mao's People's Liberation Army was motivated, had good, solid NCOs, and a decent officer corps.  In battle, there was no contest!  That is why by 1949, only two years after the "Dixie Mission,"  Mao's PLA ran Chiang's Nationalist army out of the country, to Taiwan! 
     Ultimately, after all the misery of the Korean War and Vietnam, losing all those American lives and spending billions, not to mention Korean and Vietnamese lives that were lost in the millions, we made peace with Communist China some 20 years after the cease fire in Korea.  What a shame, and what a waste of human lives!
     Even if we never did "back the right horse" and supported Mao, the whole business in Vietnam could have been avoided as well, had we supported Ho Chi Minh, instead of the incredibly corrupt Bao Dai at first, followed by Ngo Dinh Diem and a series of corrupt and inept leaders.
     During World War Two, Ho Chi Minh was our ally! Ho, along with his Viet Minh guerrillas fought the Japanese and the Vichy French in Indochina.  He was the only one to fight the Japanese!  He also helped rescue many downed U.S. airmen and worked in concert with our OSS.  His only request was that when the war ended, we help him establish an independent Vietnam.  We promised to do so.  When the war ended, Ho established a Provisional government and ask that we recognize it.  He wrote letters to President Truman that went unanswered.  Had we recognized Ho's Provisional government, that would have put an end to any future conflict.  Vietnam would have been one of those newly founded countries after World War Two.
     We, it seems, wanted to back the French who wanted to come back to Indochina and reestablish their colonial rule!  Considering that we (OSS) fought the Vichy French in Indochina along side with Ho and his Viet Minh, it is rather surprising how we turned our backs on our former ally (Ho) and supported the French!
     The result of our choice to "back the wrong horse," again, brought about one of the bloodiest and most divisive conflicts in our history.  We not only lost American lives and killed millions of Vietnamese, but caused one of the more traumatic splits in our society.  Today we try to overcompensate for what some did back then, and the current "thank you for your service" comments and flag waving at airports and welcoming returning servicemen, many who are simply returning from overseas assignments, not combat, is a bit overboard, but then, better late than never!
     Twenty years after the end of our involvement in Vietnam, we established normal relations with that "communist" country!  What if we had backed Ho from the beginning?  There would not have been all those lost lives, all that misery, and we would be trading partners with Vietnam just as we are today!
     I will sort of continue with this theme in the next blog.  Not exactly with the subject of "backing the wrong horse," but rather with why the Afghan and Iraqi armies are still not ready to fend for themselves after all these years!  Shades of Chinese Nationalist Army of old.  In their defense, today's Nationalist Army in Taiwan is an excellent military force.  They have good NCO and officer corps, not like it was in the past.  Once they were put in a position to have to fend for themselves on that island, they were quite capable of developing a good NCO and officer corps!

"Kkangpae" - the Korean Mob

     I closed out the blogs on the North Korean Kim family with a paragraph about the odd hairstyles of Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un, the hairstyles that were worn by Korean gangsters or mob members known as kkangpae.  There may be some twisted logic in the reason why the Kims' chose to sport such hairstyles.  It may be an attempt to somehow connect with the past, romantic past that may be nothing but an invention of a good story teller!  Let me elaborate on that a bit, with a background history on the kkangpae.
     Unlike the Japanese yakuza or the Chinese Triads that can trace their origin several centuries into the past, the Korean mob, the kkangpae, did not really appear until the late 19th Century, the tail-end of the Chosun Dynasty.  Prior to that, Chosun Dynasty ruled with such complete control that it would have been very difficult for any illegal organization to survive.  At the end of Chosun Dynasty, the rule relaxed and free enterprise flourished to some extent.  This allowed the appearance and growth of organized crime, the Korean Mob that came to be called kkangpae, which literally means thugs!The kkangpae operated mainly in the southern regions as well as in Japan itself!  However, it was the Korean mobs fight against the Japanese yakuza that allowed them to ultimately rise in power, and those kkangpae members who were in Japan, merged with yakuza. 
     One of the first leaders of the kkangpae mob was Kim Doo Han, son of a well known Independence Fighter Kim Jwa Jin in the early 20th Century.  Kim Doo Han became discouraged with fighting, trying to oust the Japanese from Korea.  So, to survive, he turned to life of crime and became a leader of a Korean mob.  Since most of their illegal activities were directed at the Japanese, many did not view them as criminals.  In the early 20th Century, two things happened. One, the Japanese yakuza tried to move in on Korea, which was a Japanese colony, and two, many of the yakuza members and leaders by this time were Koreans!  Kim Do Han actually ran a Korean gang, a kkangpae, in Japan when he went to "war" against the Japanese yakuza in the area, the same yakuza that was trying to move in on Korea.  It was a bloody fight, but Kim Do Han succeeded not only in defeating the Japanese yakuza and ousting them from Korea, but becoming the overall boss!
     This whole episode was much publicized by some Koreans and, of course, romanticized and liberally splashed with a patriotic theme.  It was the first "Korean victory" of any kind over the Japanese, and since it was led by a son of a famous Independence Fighter, naturally, in some circles, it was simply viewed as a victory fighting for independence!  Interestingly, many of the yakuza, including their leader, were Koreans!  So, the fact that Kim Do Han took over, was not really a big deal.  By that time, many Koreans had joined the yakuza, one of the few "jobs" available to Koreans under the Japanese rule!
     Korea was very slow to take to western ways, western clothing and fashions.  In the early 20th Century, there were still many Korean men who wore their hair long, in a bun!  Western style barbers were not that common, and Korean barbers were not familiar with western hairstyles.  The so-called ggakdooki hairstyle worn by the kkangpae in those early years, the rather ugly "do" with shaved sides, was no doubt partly the result of lack of skill in western style haircutting by Korean barbers at the time!  Kim Do Han and his followers sported ggakdooki hairstyles.  However, by the 1920s and 30s, ggakdooki went out of style even with the kkangpae.  With more exposure to the western styles by way of movies, magazines, and foreign travel, Koreans became more familiar with western mode of dress and grooming.  By the time the war ended in 1945, the kkangpae in Korea were seen sporting pompadours with greasy hair pomade, in a hairstyle that was called haikhule.  The haikhule was always identified with western fashion, western way.
     I believe that both Kim Jong Il and the son Kim Jong Un have/had ggakdooki hairstyles because they believe that it ties them closer to the Independence Fighters, namely Kim Do Han.  Be that as it may, in North Korea, there never were any kkangpae so the people no doubt identify that ugly hairstyle with Independence Fighters of old, especially since the elder Kim, the founder of North Korea was an Independence Fighter!  It just goes to show how out of touch that family is with reality!  But never mind the Kims, back to the kkangpae.
     Generically, all thugs are called kkangpae, after all, that is what the name means!  The Korean word for mob is pa, and the Korean mafia is known as gondal or jopok.  There are currently three well known mobs in Korea.  There is the Ssang Kal Pa (the Twin Knives mob), Chil Sung Pa (Seven Star mob), and the Hwan Song Sung pa (H.S.S. mob) - no one is really sure what the initials H.S.S. stand for, some think they are the first initials of the names of the founders.  Whatever the case, these are the best known organized mobs in Korea, stretching from Seoul down to Pusan.  They are organized very much like the yakuza, and although they do not tattoo their bodies extensively like the yakuza, they do wear identifying tattoos, usually to identify their gang membership and rank.
     The South Korean mob, the kkangpae has spread its tentacles all around the world, mainly because Korean businesses and enterprises are now located all over.  They are known to operate all over the United States and are often mistaken for the Japanese yakuza. They even operate in Japan, along side the yakuza with whom they had gone to war in the early 20th Century, but seem to have come to some sort of an agreement now.  In America they are quite visible in Korea Town in LA and in other cities where there are large Korean populations.
     Of the three Asian organized crime syndicates, the Japanese yakuza, the Chinese Triads, and the Korean kkangpae, the Koreans are least known.  That is because they are the youngest of the three, but it doesn't mean that they are not present in countries and cities outside of Korea.  They are all over!
     The modern day kkangpae will not be seen sporting that ugly ggakdooki hairstyle.  They will more than likely have either a shaved head (which is popular with gangsters today all over the world!) or some other form of modern hairstyle.  But if you want to see what that old Korean gangster hairstyle with its ugly shaved sides looks like, just look at the photo of Kim Jong Un or his late father Kim Jong Il.